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INDIA'S STATUS AS A NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWER
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
JAmEs A. GEEN'

ABSTRACT
Were India to be a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), internationallaw would require it to disarm its nuclear
weapons under Article H of that treaty. As a non-signatory to the NP,
however, India has never been under a conventional international law
obligation to refrainfrom acquiring,or to give up its possession of nuclear
arms. Yet an increasing number of scholars have argued that certain
provisions of the NPT including the obligation set out in Article II, have
become additionally binding in customary internationallaw. If this is the
case, India could find itself legally required to disarm its nuclear weapons,
irrespectiveof the fact that it is not bound by the NPT directly.This article
examines whether the prohibition on the possession of nuclear armsfor all
but the officially sanctioned NPT nuclear powers has indeed taken on a
customary internationallaw status. It is argued that this is probably not
the case, though it is true that a credible argument can be made in support
of the existence of such a customary norm. However, it is contended that
even if NPT Article II does have additional bindingforce in custom, India
has acquired the status of a 'persistent objector' state and thus nonetheless
retainsits legal right to possess nuclear weapons.

Reader in Public International Law, University of Reading, UK. PhD, LLM by thesis,
LLB hons. This article forms part of the British Academy funded '123 Agreement
Project' run by members of the School of Law, University of Reading, UK and colleagues
at Post Graduate Departments of Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University
in Chennai, India, of which the author is a project member and co-investigator. See
http://www.reading.ac.ukt123agreement. The author would like to express his thanks
to Thomas Koller for his help in preparing this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
India, along with a handful of other states, is in the peculiar position of
being defined under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) as a 'non-nuclear weapons state' (NNWS), while at the same time being
in possession of nuclear weapons. Under Article II of the NPT, all NNWS are
required to refrain from acquiring such weapons? In an attempt to curb nuclear
proliferation in 1968 (while pragmatically recognising that the nuclear genie
would not go back into the lead-lined bottle for those states that already had the
bomb), the NPT conferred the right to possess nuclear weapons upon only the
five 'nuclear weapons states' (NWS) that were in possession of such weapons
prior to the treaty's drafting. As a comparatively 'new' nuclear power, India is
not a member of this sacred club.
One might therefore initially assume that India's possession of nuclear
weapons is in breach of international law. However, India has always been and
remains a non-signatory to the NPT and, as such, India is not, and has never been,
bound by that treaty. Put simply, the obligation to refrain from acquiring nuclear
weapons does not apply to India under treaty law, because India is not a party to
3
the relevant treaty.
I

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1970,729 U.N.TS. 161 [Hereinafter,
'NP7].

2

Article II, NPT; Infra note 28.

3

On the basis of the rule that treaties do not directly bind non-parties. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Article 34 of which provides
that '[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its

consent'
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The NPT is often said to represent the 'cornerstone' of international law's
system of nuclear non-proliferation 4 but it is the cornerstone of a building that India
has never entered. The recent Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy('123 Agreement') 5 does to an extent bring India in from
the nuclear wilderness, 6 thus setting it somewhat apart from the three other
'outsider' nuclear powers: Israel, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (DPRK). Nonetheless, it is clear that the Indo-US deal does not impose
NPT obligations on India even indirectly. India continues to operate outside of
the NPT regime7 and, as such, is not bound by the obligation in NPT Article II.
Clearly, there is no treaty-based international law requirement for India to disarm
its nuclear weapons.
It is increasingly being argued by some scholars, however, that certain
provisions of the NPT have additionally acquired binding force through their
4

See for example, DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 8 (2009) [Hereinafter, "Joyner"]; John Simpson, The
Future of the NPT in NATHAN BUSCH AND DANIEL H. JOYNER (eds) COMBATING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 45,

46 (2009); Masahiko Asada, The Treaty on the Non-Prolferationof Nuclear Weapons and
the Universalisationof the Additional Protocol,16 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW

3,3 (2011); Winston Nagan and Erin Slemmens, National Security Policy and Ratiftcation
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 32 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 40

(2009-2010); Fact Sheet: Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty, 2 United States Department of
5

6

7

State Dispatch 12 (1991).
Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (October
10, 2008) available at http://responsiblenucleartrade.com/keydocuments/india 123
agreement text.pdf. The 123 Agreement is a bilateral treaty between India and the
United States, which aims to 'to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation' between
the parties (see Article 2). The deal is termed a '123 Agreement' after § 123 of the
United States Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (1954) 83-703 Public Law 68 Statute 919, which
provides, inter alia, that before the United States can cooperate over nuclear materials
with any other state, an agreement must be signed setting out the 'terms, conditions,
duration, nature and scope of the cooperation'. The United States has made over twenty
such bilateral '123' agreements.
See for example, MAR1o CARRANZA, SouT ASIAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
ORDER: CREATING A ROBUST INDO-PAKISTANi NUCLEAR ARMS CON'rROL REGIME 2,44(2009)
[Hereinafter, "Carranza"]; KesavWable, The US-India Strategic Nuclear Partnership:A
DebilitatingBlow to the Non-ProliferationRegime, 33 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 719, 720-721 (2007-2008) [Hereinafter, "Wable"l.

Wable, 729-730; Jbrn Miller, The Signing of the US-India Agreement ConcerningPeaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy, I G&n"INGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-198 (2009);
P.R. Chari, Introduction in P. R. CHARI (ed) INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL: SEEKING SYNERGY
IN BILATERALISM 1, 9 (2009).
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subsequent adoption into customary internationallaw.A Unlike treaty law, which only
binds states that have signed and ratified the treaty in question,9 rules of customary
international law bind all states primafacie.Y' One implication of a finding that key
provisions of the NPT are also binding in custom, then, would be that India is
primafacie in breach of international law simply by possessing nuclear weapons,
as this is something prohibited for all but the five 'official' NWS under Article II
of the NPT. In other words, India would have the status of an NPT non-signatory
state that was nonetheless bound to disarm its nuclear arsenal and then refrain from
(re)obtaining any nuclear arms in the future, albeit that this obligation incumbent
on India would derive from customary international law and not directly by way
of the NPT itself.
Having said this, there is a possible exception to customary international law's
universally binding force: the so-called 'persistent objector rule'. This rule provides
that 'a State which persistently objects to a rule of customary international law
during the formative stages of that rule will not be bound by it when it comes into
existence." States are thus - at least in theory - not bound by new customary rules
to which they have persistently objected. The continued practice of post-nuclear
India in rejecting specific aspects (and indeed the very nature) of the legal nuclear
non-proliferation regime would certainly fit the model of a 'persistent objector'
state. It can therefore be argued that India is not merely a non-signatory to the
8

See for example Wable, 738; David Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States
Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty?, 93 WISCONSIN LAw REVIEW

301, 390 (1993); Carranza, 42; Thomas Graham, South Asia and the Future of Nuclear
Nonprolife ration (1998), ARMS CONTROL TODAY available at http://www.armscontrol.
org/act 1998 05/grmy98> (arguing that, by 1998 and independent of the NPT,"an

international norm of behaviour [had! developed establishing that the number of nuclearweapon states...would remain atfive."); Susan Carmody, Balancing Collective Security and
National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea's Nuclear
Facilities,18 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 229, 273 (1994-1995); OrdeKittrie,
Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Is Losing Its Deterrence

Ca

Rand How to Restore It MICHIGAN JOURNAL

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

337, 340-341,

34S-350(2006-2007) [Hereinafter, "Kittrie"] (indicating that the non-proliferation regime
may be custmary in natre, but ultimately not concluding decisively on the question);
Geoffrey Carison, An Offer They Can't Reuse - The Security Council Tells North Korea to
COLUMBIA OURNAL or TRANSNATIONAL
n46
theNuclear
LAw 420, 429-431 (2007-2008) (though the customary status of aspects of the regime

is only implicit in Carlson's analysis); Andreas Persbo, is the Partial Test Ban Treaty
available at hp://www.armscontrolverification.org/2006/10/
Customary
(though again, this
[Hereinafter,
is-partial-test-ban-treaty-cstoma.hto
conclusion is only implicit in Persbo's analysis).
9

Supra note 3.

10

See for example, James Kelly, The Twilight of Customary InternationalLaw, 40
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

11

VIRGINIA

449, 451 (1999-2000).

Olufemi Elias, PersistentObjector,MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw (2009) availableat www.mpepil.com. This is a good expression of the common

definition of the rule [Hereinafter, "Elias"].
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NPT, but is also a persistent objector to any customary international law norms
that may 'mirror' the provisions of that treaty.
This article considers, first, whether Article II of the NPT may have acquired
additional binding force under customary international law, as some scholars have
argued. Such a claim is highly debatable, but can be credibly made. Secondly,
there follows an examination of India's possible persistent objector status to any
such customary prohibition on the acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons
(for all but the 'official' NPT NWS), assuming that one accepts that this customary
obligation exists at all. As a non-signatory to the NPT, it is indisputable that India
has every right under conventional (that is, treaty-based) international law to
possess nuclear weapons. The aim of this article is therefore to clarify India's nuclear
weapons power status under customary international law.
It is concluded that the obligation contained in NPT Article II is probably not
separately binding in customary international law, albeit that a case for this can be
made. In any event, even if one accepts a customary international law obligation on
NNWS to disarm, this cannot apply to India because it has persistently objected to
this obligation, meaning that it is exempt from any possible customary international
law rule. India therefore retains a legal right to possess its nuclear weapons in
treaty law (because it is not a party to the NPT) and in customary international
law (because it is unclear whether such an obligation exists in custom and, even
if it does, the rule cannot bind India because of India's persistent objector status).

II.

THE CUSTOMARY STATUS OF ARTICLE

II

OF THE

NPT

A. Background to the NPT Regime and the Substance of Article II
This article is not the place to examine the nuclear non-proliferation regime
under international law in any detail, 2 but a very brief summary is here necessary.
It is often stated, as noted above, that the NPT represents the 'cornerstone' of
international law's system of non-proliferation. 3 As is well known, the treaty
provides the underpinning legal framework in this area by setting out a system
of differentiated obligations between two groups of states: the NWS and the
12
13
14

An excellent summary of the nuclear non-proliferation regime under international
law is provided by Joyner, 3-76.
Supra note 4.
For the purposes of the NPT, a NWS "is one which has manufacturedand exploded a nuclear
weapon or other nuclearexplosive device priorto 1 January1967." Article IX (3), NPT. This

group is comprised of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council:
the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), France
and China.
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NNWS." The NPT embodies and formalises a 'grand bargain' between these two
groups.1 6 By entering into the legal framework of the NPT, the NNWS undertook
not to seek to acquire, by any means, nuclear weapons."These states also accepted
an obligation to conclude safeguard agreements with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor their peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to be
restricted by such agreements in the context of the transfer of nuclear materials or
technology for peaceful purposes. 8
In return for this promise on the part of the NNWS to curtail the global
spread of nuclear armaments - and to concede their pre-existing right to acquire
them - the NPT reaffirmed the 'inalienable right' of all states to pursue peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.19 Furthermore, the NWS undertook to refrain from
the proliferation of nuclear weapons (or technologies that could lead to their
development), ° gave a commitment to facilitate the advancement of peaceful uses
of nuclear energy in other states2' and, finally, agreed to move towards complete
nuclear disarmament themselves.? The law regarding non-proliferation, then, is
essentially premised on the bargain at the heart of the NPT between the nuclear
2
'haves' and 'have-nots'. 3
Under the NPT framework, India (along with Pakistan, Israel and the DPRK)
is in the anomalous position of being a defacto nuclear 'have', while at the same
time being classed as a de jure nuclear 'have-not'. India clearly does not meet the
NPTs definition for a NWS, in that it had not 'manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon' prior to I January 1967.24 Under the NPT, then, India is defined
as a NNWS. Yet India has in effect been part of the'nuclear powers club' since the
Pokhran-I tests of 1974 and the detonations of what India termed 'peaceful nuclear

15
16
17
18

Being those states that do not meet the test for NWS set out in Article IX(3), NPT.
See for example Joyner, 9.
See Article I, NPT.
Article III, NPT.

19

Article IV,NPT.

20
21

Article L NPT.
Article V,NPT.
Article VI, NPT.
Andreas Paulus and J6rn Miller, Survival Through Law: Is There a Law Against Nuclear
Proliferation,18 FINNISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 133 (2007) (Hereinafter,

22

23

"PAULUS AND

24

MOLER"].

Artide TX (3), NPT; Supra note 14 and 15.
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explosions.'2 This defacto status as a nuclear weapons state was obviously firmly
underlined by the 1998 Pokhran-II tests and India's explicit self-declaration of
nuclear weaponisation.16 Nonetheless, at least as the regime of the NPT currently
functions, India is officially a NNWSY
The key provision of the NPT in relation to India's nuclear weapons power
status is Article II, which provides:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not
to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 28
Thus, if India were to become an NPT party - something which will simply
not happen under the current NPT framework, but let us suspend our disbelief
momentarily - given that it is technically a NNWS in possession of nuclear
weapons, it would be bound under Article II to disarm all existing nuclear arms
and to desist from producing or acquiring any more. Of course, India will never
join the NPT as a NNWS, but if the obligat iii contained within Article II can also
be considered as being binding under customary internationallaw, then India would
be obliged to give up its nuclear arsenal, irrespective of the fact that it is not bound
to do so directly under the NPT.
B. Is Article II of the NPT also Binding in Customary International Law?
The crucial question, then, is whether NPT Article II also has binding force
under customary international law (or, more accurately, whether the obligation

25

26
27
28

P.R. Chad, Pokharan-I:PersonalReflections 80, INSTITUTE OP PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES,
SPECIAL REPORT (1999), available at http://www.ipcs.orglpdfjfile/issue/SR80-ChariFinal.pdf. The 1974 Pokhran-I tests were in reality largely indistinguishable from
the explosion of a nuclear weapon, see Carranza, 44. On this basis Ahlstr6m tellingly
referred to the tests as being "allegedly peaceful", Christer Ahlstr6m, Arrowsfor India? Technology Transfersof Ballistic Missile Defence and the Missile Technology Control Regime,
9 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAw 103, 119 (2004).
See Statements from India and Pakistan, BBC News (1998) availableat http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/events/asianuclear-crisis/world-media/l14139.stm.
Wable, 730.
Article ILNPT.
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contained in NPT Article IIis additionally a rule of custom). It is certainly possible
for customary legal rules to stem initially from provisions in multilateral treaties
and become binding on non-parties.-" As D'Amato has phrased this:
A treaty is obviously not equivalent to custom; it binds only the
parties, and binds them only according to the enforcement provisions
contained in the treaty itself. However, rules in treaties reach3 beyond
the parties because a treaty itself constitutes state practice. 0
As with customary international law more generally, the additional customary
status of any given treaty rule ultimately turns on whether said rule has been
sufficiently practiced, and whether states have accepted the rule as being customary
international law (the so-called 'opinio juris' element)YA number of writers have
taken the view that some of the treaty-based nuclear non-proliferation norms
contained in the NPT have become part of customary international law. However,
NPT Article 11 can only be viewed as being customary law if sufficient state practice
and opinio juris are present.
With regard to the state practice element, those writers that claim the
customary status of certain NPT provisions point to the fact that the NPT enjoys
near-universal membership and adherenceY3As of December 2011, the NPT has
29

For example, Article 38, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 holds that

a treaty can become "binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international

law, recognized as such". This position has also been adopted more than once by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), most notably in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany
v. Netherlands) merits, [19691 ICJ Reports 4, at [60]-[81] [Hereinafter, "North Sea
Continental Shelf]. See also Roger Clark, Treaty and Custom in LAURENCE BOISSON

DE CHAZOURNES AND PHILIPPE SANDS (eds), INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 171, 172-176 (1999). On the parallel nature

of obligations that are binding in both conventional and customary international law,

see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United

States of America), jurisdiction of the court and admissibility of the application [1984]

30

ICJ Reports 392 at [73].
Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

101, 103 (1987) [Hereinafter, "D'Amato"].
See Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gauel: The Influence of the
InternationalCriminalTribunalson the ICRC CustomaryLaw Study, 11 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT
AND SECURITY LAW 239. 244 (2006) [Hereinafter, "Cryer"]. These two elements - state
practice and opiniojuris- are required for all customary international law formation. For
a detailed examination, see Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 47
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-53 (1974-1975) [Hereinafter, "AKEHirrst].
INTERNATIONAL LAW

31

32 Supra note 8.
33 For example, Persbo indicates that near universal membership of the NPT is indicative
of the customary international law status of NPT Article IIobligations, although this

is only implicit inhis analysis, see Persbo.
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189 states parties?' In 1996, when the treaty had 182 states parties, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) referred to this group of states - which has since grown - as
'the vast majority of the international community. ' Moreover, the NNWS that are
party to the NPT have for the most part adhered to the obligations of the regime.
As Kittrie notes, 'State practice in the early 1990s, and indeed still today, manifests
more compliance than with many of the most widely recognised customary
international law norms.'3
Admittedly, certain NNWS have been accused of 'displaying schizophrenic
tendencies' in the context of campaigning for NWS nuclear disarmament in relation
to NPT Article VI? Moreover, in the context of Article VI, it is clear that NWS
have consistently flouted their obligation to move in good faith towards nuclear
disarmament. 8 This ongoing neglect of Article VI was noted obiter dicta by the
ICJ in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.3
Indeed, the Court pointed that Article VI constituted an 'obligation to achieve a
precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. ' " This was an obligation
the Court clearly felt had not been met by the official NWS.
Such contrary state practice means that it is impossible to view Article VI
as being additionally binding in customary international law.' However, this is
actually not directly relevant to the current analysis, as Article VI relates to the
possession of nuclear weapons by the NPT NWS. The obligation contained in
Article VI would be inapplicable to India even if that obligation was additionally

34

The current status of the NPT is availableat http://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.
aspx?objid-08000002801d56c5. The figure of 189 does not include Taiwan, which
subscribes to and adheres to the obligations within the NPT but is obviously an entity

36

with debatable statehood.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Reports
226 at [100] [Hereinafter, "Nuclear Weapons"].
Kittrie, 349.

37

Miguel Bosch, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Future in

35

LAURENCE BOISSON DE

CHAZOURNES AND PHILIPPE SANDS (EDS)INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

39

375-38, 381 (1999) [Hereinafter, "BoscH"].
See Adam Steinfeld, Nuclear Objections: The Persistent Objector and the Legality of the
Use of Nuclear Weapons, 62 BROOKLYN LAw REVIEW 1635-1686, 1670 (1996) [Hereinafter,
"STEINFEUY"]. Having said this, it is worth noting that Joyner has pointed out that it
may be possible to argue that the NPT NWS have met their obligations under Article
VI (though the present author would strongly dispute this and it is not an argument
that Joyner himself subscribes to). See DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATiON TREATY 95-108(2011).
Nuclear Weapons, 98-100.

40

Nuclear Weapons, 99.

41

JOYNER,69.

OF JUsTIcE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

38
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binding in customary international law because, as already noted, India does not
technically qualify as a NWS under the NPT.
Therefore, in the context of this paper, the finding that the obligation contained
in Article VI is not a rule of customary international law simply underlines the fact
one cannot view the NPT as having been adopted into custom wholesale. It does
not mean that other provisions of the treaty are incapable of taking on a binding
character in custom. In contrast to Article VI, it is notable that a survey of the state
practice relating to Article II (an obligation that could be applicable to India under
customary international law, given that it is technically defined as a NNWS state)
indicates that adherence is widespread. 2
Of course, such adherence is not universal: there are obviously notable
absentees from the NPT. India aside, Israel, Pakistan and the DPRK also all possess
nuclear weapons de facto - despite 'official' NNWS status under the NPT - and

are non-parties to the treaty. 3 Yet the handful of technical NNWS states operating
outside the regime does not necessarily debar the customary status of some of the
NPT NNWS rules, including Article I. Universal practice is certainly not required
for customary international law formation"' and, as will be discussed in the next
section, these states could be viewed as persistent objectors anyway.
It is notable that with regard to the DPRK's nuclear weapons policy,
particularly since 2003, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has held that
the DPRK remains bound by provisions of the NPT relating to NNWS, in spite of
it having withdrawn from the treaty 5 This would suggest implicit acceptance of
42

As Bosch has stated: "[Alt each of the NPT's five review conferences, two fundamental
questions have been raised. First, have the NNWS lived up to their partof the bargain...laind
second, have the NWSfulfilled their nucleardisarmamentobligations? Invariably,the answer
to the first question has been in the affirmative while the second has been in the negative."
BoscH, 388; Supra note 35.

43

India, Pakistan and Israel have never been party to the NPT, whereas the DPRK
withdrew from the treaty, under Article X,in a cloud of controversy in 2003, see North
Korea withdrawsfrom Nuclear Pact,BBC NEws (2003) availableat http://news.bbc.co.uki1/

hi/2644593.stm; Infra note 46.
44

45

As the ICJ noted in 1986: "It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application
of rules in question should be perfect...The Court does not consider that,for the rule to be
established,the correspondingpractice must be in absolute rigorousconformity with the rule."
Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua(NicaraguavUnited States of
America) Merits [1986] ICJ Reports 14 at [185] [Hereinafter, "Nicaragua"].
See S.C Res.1695, U.N. SCOR, 61st Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 2006, UN Doc. S/RES/1695 (2006) ("Deploring the DPRK's ...stated Pursuit of
nuclearweapons in spiteof its Treaty on Non-ProliferationofNuclear Weapons...obligations").
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the customary status of the key provisions applicable to NNWS by the Security
Council, in that this is the most logical explanation of why the Council saw the
DPRK as still being bound by these NPT obligations."
Given the near-universal membership of the NPT and the widespread
compliance by NNWS NPT parties with the obligation in Article II, a credible
case can be made that there exists sufficient state practice to evidence the claim
that the rule contained in Article II is also binding in customary international law.
However, the extent of supporting opiniojuris for a customary prohibition on the
possession of nuclear weapons (for all but the NPT NWS) is somewhat less evident.
It is rather rare for states to explicitly endorse the customary nature of NPT rules.
This is not to say that no such examples exist. States have on occasion explicitly
argued that NPT rules are additionally binding in customary international law:
take, for example, Venezuela's repeated affirmation of this view during the 1998
Conference on Disarmament. 7 Such evidence of explicit opinio juris to this effect,
though, is notable because of its scarcity.
More generally, the inexact process by which customary international law
comes into being means that there is a good deal of latitude to construct a claim
that any given norm has or has not taken on customary law status.4 One must be
very careful in unilaterally asserting that a rule - any rule - is binding in custom.
This is particularly pronounced when the rule in question has its roots in a treaty.4 '
State adherence to obligations contained in a treaty may simply be because the
treaty-based obligations are already binding on states parties, something that is
46

However, this is not the only interpretation of this finding by the Security Council. It is
possible that the DPRK remains bound by the NPT on the basis that - as some states
have argued - its withdrawal under Article X was invalid On the complicated legal
issue of the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT, which goes beyond the scope of this
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especially relevant when the treaty is one with as substantial a membership as
the NPT.1°
The paucity of examples of explicit opinio juris affirming the customary
international law status of the obligation found in NPT Article 11 can therefore
perhaps be explained by the fact that most states would view such an overt
expression of opinio juris as being unnecessary, given that they are already NPT
members. The vast majority of NNWS states understandably will see the prohibition
on the acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons by NNWS as self-evidently
applicable to them, given that they are conventionally bound by it already. This
significantly clouds the issue of whether sufficient opinio jurisexists to support the
widespread state practice in affirming the customary status of Article IIof the NPT.
In addition to the difficulty of identifying adequate supporting opinio juris,
a conceptual argument has been raised against the customary international law
status of provisions of the NPT. This view is primarily based on the unusual
status of the NPT as a large multilateral 'contract treaty'; in other words, a treaty
with a quid pro quo arrangement at its core, as contrasted with a pure 'law-making
51
treaty' creating common standards of legal obligation for all parties. Joyner, for
example, argues that the fact that no universal set of obligations exist under the NPT
means that these rules cannot take on the character of customary international law
obligations.- Another way of phrasing this same argument is to say that, because of
the differentiated 'two-tier' obligations at the heart of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime, the provisions of the NPT are not such that they 'could be regarded as
forming the basis of a general rule of law' (this requirement being one of the criteria
50

Compare the NPT with the argument raised by Judge Sir Robert Jennings in his
dissenting opinion attached to the Nicaragua case, as to the customary status of the
prohibition of the use of force deriving from Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United

Nations (1945) 1 United Nations Treaty Series 16: "there are obvious difficulties about
extractingeven a scintillaof relevant "practice"...fromthe behaviourof thosefew States which
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set out by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases for determining whether
treaty-based rules could also be considered as being binding in custom).
Yet it is not entirely clear that the NPT is in fact a 'contract treaty': the line
between 'law-making treaties' and 'contract treaties' is not well defined," and the
multilateral nature of the NPT does not actually resemble the common bilateral
'contract treaty' model. More importantly, the present writer takes the view that,
while establishing customary rules based on differentiated treaty obligations is
certainly not straightforward, the quidproquo nature of the NPT is not necessarily a
bar to these norms being adopted into custom. It is clear that a 'general rule of law'
in custom can form in a manner that produces differentiated obligations on states.
The obvious example of this is 'regional' customary international law (or what is
also sometimes called 'special' or 'local' customary international law), which binds
some states but not all.YAs a matter of legal principle, then, there is no reason why
the obligations of a customary non-proliferation regime could not collectively form
along similar lines. The obligation under NPT Article 11 could develop in custom
so as to only apply to states that met the test for those entities to which the Article
was designed to apply: NNWS. In other words, it is conceptually quite possible
that customary obligations have formed that are 'general' in the sense of applying
to all NNWS, even if they are not 'universal' in the sense of applying to all states.
Overall, it is clear that there is no comprehensive customary requirement to

disarm nuclear weapons, because this would require that the obligations contained
in both NPT Article II and Article VI were together adopted into customary
international law. Only then would any customary disarmament obligation apply
to NWS and NNWS alike. Article VI has not taken on customary status: there is
simply no state practice to support such a finding.1
The situation is less clear cut in relation to Article IIof the NPT (which would
be applicable to India were it an NPT party). It is very difficult to determine whether
the obligation in Article 1 of the NPT is also binding in customary international
law. There is some evidence to suggest that such customary crystallisation may
53
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(3'edn., 2010); Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Special Custom in InternationalLaw,
63 AMERWCAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-223 (1969); Akehurst, 28-31; Right of
Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) merits [19601 ICJ Reports 4, at 1391.
Supra note 38-41.

Vol. 24(l)

National Law School of India Review

2012

have taken place but, equally, significant doubts remain. In the view of the present
author, it is probably not the case that the rule contained within Article II has
taken on the additional status of a customary norm. This writer feels that the
preponderance of evidence, particularly the relative lack of supporting opiniojuris,
indicates that a prohibition on the acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons
(for any states other than 'official' NWS) has not yet crystallised. If this is correct it
means that -just like under conventional international law - India is not bound by
any obligation to disarm its nuclear weapons under customary international law.

III. Is INDIA A PERSISTENT OBJECTOR To ANY
CUSTOMARY PROHIBITION ON THE ACQUISITION AND
POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
It was tentatively concluded in the previous section that no customary
international law requirement of nuclear disarmament has emerged for states that
had not exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967. Nonetheless, it must
be noted that such a claim does have a credible basis, is supported by a number
of scholars and, thus, should not be dismissed out of hand. This section therefore
proceeds from the starting point that a customary counterpart to NPT Article II
has crystallised, despite the fact that this view is not ultimately subscribed to by
the current author.
If one takes the position that a customary requirement to disarm is applicable
to India prima facie, it must then be asked whether India - as a longstanding
'outsider' to the international nuclear legal order - can be considered a 'persistent
objector' state with regard to this norm. Were India to have acquired persistent
objector status, it would remain unbound by any obligation to disarm, irrespective
of whether that norm is generally binding under customary international law or not.
A. Common Understandings of the Persistent Objector Rule
It is first necessary to briefly set out the nature of the persistent objector rule.8
Throughout the UN era there has been widespread scholarly57 and some judicial
acceptance of therule as an aspect of customary international law formation. As
has already been noted, the persistent objector rule says that if a state persistently
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objects to a newly emerging norm of customary international law during the
formation of that norm, then that state is exempt from the norm once the custom
has crystallised. The persistent objector rule is, therefore, usually viewed as having
two requirements, both of which need to be satisfied for it to operate:"6
1)

Somewhat obviously, given the rule's name, the state in question must object
persistently. It is not seen as sufficient for a state to object to a newly emerging
law only once: put simply, 'sporadic or isolated objections will not do.' 6'

2)

The persistent objection must occur during theformation of the norm. Objection
once the new law has become binding is insufficient; in other words, states
that are 'subsequent objectors' will nonetheless be bound.2

In predominant positivist understandings of the 'horizontal' international
legal system, states are not bound by law to which they have not consented to be
bound." The identification of consent with regard to treaties is obviously relatively
straightforward (based on the process of signature and ratification), but consent
is more difficult to establish for customary international law." State consent in the
context of the formation of custom is necessarily premised on silence as constituting
tacit consent: this is largely for practical reasons, as customary international law
would stagnate if explicit consent on the part of all states was required. 5 It is here
where the persistent objector rule is commonly seen as fulfilling a crucial role. At
least theoretically, the rule preserves state autonomy - not to mention the positivist
conception of a consent-based legal system - by providing states with a means to
withdraw consent. 6
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There are numerous issues concerning the persistent objector rule that are
worthy of further discussion but which go beyond the scope of this papery Yet two
further points need to be made about the rule for the purposes of this section. First,
it is important to note, given the focus of this article on the NPT,that non-parties
to a treaty can similarly achieve exemption - through the usual operation of the
persistent objector rule - from any customary counterpart norms that emerge: '[i] f
they persist with their objection to the provisions of the treaty, they could become
persistent objectors on the international plane.'" Secondly, it is necessary to consider
whether acts are enough to constitute 'objections' for the purposes of the persistent
objector rule, or whether explicit statements of objection are required. Preponderant0
academic opinion seems to support the view that 'acts' of objection will suffice.'
B. Is India a Persistent Objector to any Customary Requirement to Disarm?
Perhaps the clearest indications of India's persistent objector status, then,
71
are its actions. India's Pokhran-I nuclear tests of 1974, and more notably the
1998 Pokhran-I1 tests (coupled with India's explicit self-proclamation of nuclear
weaponisation),7? are acts that clearly demonstrate a rejection of the NPT system.
India's de facto attainment of nuclear weapons in 1974 amounts to 'objection by
deed' to any possible customary norm restricting its possession of such weapons,
as does its 1998 tests and its overt declaration of nuclear weapons power status
following those tests.
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For example, some writers have questioned how many times a state must object for
this to qualify as 'persistent' objection. It is commonly agreed that a single objection
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offorms, from actualexercise ofa legal right, to statements expressing a desire to preserve that
right."(emphasis removed from original). See also Colson, 958. However, for a contrary
view, see Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati, Withdrawingfrom InternationalCustom, 120
YALE LAW JOURNAL 202, 211 (2010).
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Of course, the very fact that India is not a signatory to the NPT similarly
demonstrates a stance of objection towards any parallel customary regime. More
explicitly, in spite of a longstanding commitment to non-proliferation and an
excellent record in this regard,m India has repeatedly rejected the obligations
of the legal nuclear non-proliferation regime (and its entire differentiated
framework) outright. As Frey notes, India's discourse on nuclear weapons
has always 'vehemently dismissed' the legal status quo as 'discriminatory and
imperialist.'74 lndeed, India has famously promulgated the term 'nuclear apartheid'
to describe international law's approach to nuclear non-proliferation. 5
India's consistent and absolute rejection of the NPT and international law's
wider nuclear regime- from inception -can be seen in numerous official statements.
One classic example amongst many is a speech made by Indira Gandhi to the
Indian Parliament in 1968, where the Indian Prime Minister was explicit in rejecting
the entire NPT framework based on a policy of 'enlightened self-interest and the
considerations of national security.' 76 Much more recently, India has reaffirmed its
objection to the NPT and its associated regime in the context of the 2008 Indo-US
123 Agreement? For example, Hardeep Pur, the Indian Permanent Representative
to the UN, wrote to United States UN Ambassador Susan Rice in September 2009
that: 'India cannot accept calls for universalisation of the NPT ..there is no question
of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. ' 8Further, Puri seemingly
73
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went on to affirm India's stance as a persistent objector to any possible equivalent
nuclear non-proliferation customary obligations - albeit that he did not refer
directly to the persistent objector concept - by explicitly stating with regard to
nuclear non-proliferation that India did not 'accept any obligations arising from
treaties that fit] has not signed or ratified/n
In addition to such official statements, India's voting policy in international
organs can also be seen as a manifestation of persistent objection. For example,
in 1997, India voted against General Assembly Resolution 52/38-K, operative
paragraph 1,8 which urged non-NPT parties to join the treaty." India was one of
only three states to cast a dissenting vote (the others being, unsurprisingly, Israel
and Pakistan), while 162 states voted in favour of the resolution.2 Overall, then,
as Raisummarises, India has always consistently been 'against [the international
legal regime relating to nuclear weapons] and its philosophy because of its
discriminatory character.' 3
It will be recalled from the previous subsection that persistent objection must
occur during the formation of the customary rule and not after its crystallisation
alone.8 As such, it is worth noting that even if one subscribes to the customary
nature of the obligation within NPT Article II, such adoption into customary
international law can only have been based on the decades of state practice
since the inception of the NPT. During the 1960s twenty-three states either were
in possession of nuclear weapons, were involved in nuclear weapons-related
research, or were openly seeking the acquisition of such weapons.,' This figure
has now dropped to nine states, five of which are the NPT NWS. It is a feature of
more recent - post-Cold War - practice that has led, for example, to Ukraine and
South Africa having relinquished nuclear weapons, and Brazil and Libya having
ended their nuclear weapons programmes M On this basis it has been suggested
by one writer that the 'crystallisation' of certain NPT rules into custom occurred in
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the mid-1990s.l'Assuming that this is correct, India's persistent objections would
clearly pre-date the norm crystallising in custom (if, of course, one accepts that
such crystallisation has taken place at all) and can, therefore, reasonably be viewed
as having occurred during the formation of the customary international law rule
in question.
India's various dissents, by way of both deed and explicit statement, have
all the hallmarks of classic persistent objection in a technical sense with regard to
any customary requirement to disarm or prohibition on the possession of nuclear
weapons outside of the sacred circle of the NPT NWS. India's'persistent resistance""
has been both sustained and prior to crystallisation. As such, to the extent that
a customary international law rule reflecting NPT Article 11 exists at all, India is
a persistent objector to it. 9As Keeley has stated, if the NPT rules applicable to
NNWS have entered into customary international law, 'the fact that India objected
to the distinction even as it was being negotiated, refused to sign the NPT on this
basis, and has been consistent in its protest since, would seem to qualify it for the
"persistent objector" exception. ' "
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is arguable whether the obligation contained in NPT Article II
has additionally been adopted into customary international law. This is supported
in particular by the near-universal ratification of the NPT and the material fact that
almost all NNWS (as determined by the NPT) abide by the requirements of Article
H1.Having said this, the evidence in support of such a customary prohibition on
the possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons is far from entirely conclusive:
it is not clear whether sufficient opiniojuris exists, and there are also conceptual
difficulties that may arise from the fact that the NPT is a treaty with differentiated
obligations. This author is ultimately of the view that no customary international
law norm prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons by NNWS has (as yet)
emerged. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible to conclude that NPT Article II has
additional binding force in custom.
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If one subscribes to the existence of this customary prohibition, then it would
prima facie bind India, even though India is a non-signatory to the NPT. This is
because customary international law essentially binds all states, unlike treaty law.
Under the NPT framework, India is defined as a NNWS and, therefore - assuming
the Article II obligation also exists in custom - would be legally required to disarm
all its nuclear weapons and to refrain from the development or acquisition of any
more.
However, India has clearly persistently objected to the NPT to international
law's wider non-proliferation regime and to any related customary norms. Such
objectors are exempt from the binding force of rules of customary international
law, so long as they object persistently and throughout the development of the
rule. Through sustained action of deed and statement prior to and during the
formation of any arguable customary international law requirement to disarm,
India has thus dissented and so is not bound.
Following the Pokhran-Il nuclear tests, the focus of nuclear policy in many
states with regard to India quickly moved away from the NPT regime per se.
Instead of pursuing the now patent fantasy of India joining the NPT as a NNWS,
Western policy towards the 'Indian nuclear weapons question' has been based on
an arguably more realistic goal: persuading India to sign the 1996 Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.'It is notable that since the international condemnation
of the 1998 Pokhran-I tests, no major power (other than the European Union) has
attempted to urge India to join the NPT, as either a NWS or a NNWS. 92
Indeed, soon after the dust had (literally) settled following the 1998 tests,
India's status as a nuclear weapons power was largely accepted by other states
(at least defacto): India's persistent objector stance was 'accepted, not only within
India but also by the majority of the states of the world.' This defacto acceptance
91
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of India's nuclear weapons power status has been most graphically underlined
by the 2008 Indo-US 123 Agreement for civil nuclear cooperation, which has been
described as India's 'admission to the nuclear club. ' 4 Such implicit recognition
has also been further strengthened by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver,
which allowed the 123 Agreement to be 'operationalised' outside of the usual
nuclear control regime."
In thefinal analysis, what matters most is the hard fact that India is in possession
of nuclear weapons and is understandably determined to keep hold of them: this
is surely the most potent indication of India's continued persistent objection, both
de jure and de facto. As Steinfeld points out, the 'nuclear objector' is extremely
unlikely to buckle under pressure from the wider international community, as can
be seen from the failure of the NWS to meet their disarmament obligations under
NPT Article VI.9 Given the perception of nuclear weapons as an effective security
deterrent, so intrinsically tied up with notions of self-determination, power and
defence, even if international law was to consider persistent objection in relation
to the possession of nuclear weapons to be unacceptable, such a position would
be naive to the point of irrelevancy.
This is particularly apparent in the case of India: any attempts to pressure
India into signing the NPT as a NNWS, or to otherwise accept a legal requirement
for it to disarm without the same requirement being effectively applied to all
other states, have 'aroused intense nuclear nationalism...This form of nationalism
is much stronger in India than any other nuclear countries and is very much tied
to India's notion of national independence and their particular colonial history.'gn
Ultimately India retains a legal right to possess its nuclear weapons underboth
treaty law and customaryinternationallaw. This obviously has significant implications
for India's geopolitical status, including the way it is perceived regionally and
internationally. Perhaps most importantly for India, the findings in this paper
act as a legal confirmation of its existing political standpoint. India is viewed by
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some as something of a 'nuclear pariah' state, because of its unwillingness to sign
the NPT and its possession of nuclear weapons outside of the international legal
system's usual framework." However, it is important to note that India has not
been, and is not, in breach of international law in this context, irrespective of the
political standpoint may take with regard to India's possession of nuclear weapons.
Put simply: India will not relinquish the bomb, ' and nor does international law
require it to.
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